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NORMATIVE, AND SOMEWHERE TO GO?
REFLECTIONS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

RICHARD F. DEVLIN•
In this article the author offers some reflections on
professional responsibility. He straddles the optimist
and pessimist perspectives espousing
''pessoptimism" as a more adequate position than
either extreme. The author begins by deconstructing
the title of the conference in which the paper was
delivered: "A New Look: A National Conference on
the Legal Profession and Ethics," which took place
in Calgary, in June I 994.
Pursuing a middle path between the optimistic and
pessimistic approaches t o professional
responsibility, the author outlines the parameters of
his ethical vision which provides some directions
for legal practice. There are three elements to his
restructured ethical vision: the "talent" of critical
self-reflexivity, the maxim to act responsibly and the
injunction to do no harm.
The author draws two conclusions from his
study: first, it is possible to talk about legal ethics
and to outline some procedural and substantive
ethical guidelines. Second, ethics are plural and
diversified, contingent upon the nature of the "law
job" involved.
Finally, the author attempts to locate the "ethical
triad" in the context of several different aspects of
the legal profession; in legal education, as law
students, lawyers, judge�. benchers and legislators.
He suggests that the primary responsibility for
improved legal service lies with those who are
within the system and that legal ethics ought to be
seen as enforceable ''public" norms.
In conclusion, returning to the notion of
''pessoptimism, " the author advocates an optimistic
approach but sets out reservations and cautions. In
the end, the author hopes that if the legal
community cannot agree to do more good, perhaps
ii can at least agree to do less harm.

L 'auteur offre quelques reflexions sur la notion de
responsabilite professionnelle. 1/ professe un certain
«pessoptimisme», plus approprie selon lui que
l'optimisme ou le pessimisme. II commence par
deconstruire le titre du congres OU ii a presente son
article. «A New Look: A national Conference on the
Legal Profession and Ethics», qui a eu lieu a
Calgary en juin I 994.
Dans cette perspective intermediaire, I !auteur
definit /es parametres de sa vision ethique et
propose que/ques lignes directrices pour la pratique
du droit. Cette vision ethique restructuree comprend
trois elements : le «don» d'auto-examen critique, la
dete,;mination d'agir de far;on responsable et
/'obligation de ne pas nuire.
L'auteur tire deux conclusions de son elude
premierement, ii est possible de par/er d'ethique
juridique et de decrire certaines directives ethiques
procedurales et materiel/es. Deuxiemement,
l'ethique est p/urielle et diverse, et depend de la
nature des ttiches juridiques concernees.
Finalement, /'auteur tente de situer la triade
ethique en abordant plusieurs aspects de la
profession juridique - dans l'enseignement du
droit, du point de vue des e/eves, des avocats, des
juges, des membres du conseil general du barreau
et des legislateurs. II suggere que la responsabi/ite
d'ameliorer /es services juridiques incombe avant
tout ceux qui sont l'interieur du systeme et que
l'ethique devrait etre perr;ue a titre de normes
publiques executoires.
En conclusion, revenant a la notion de
pessoptimisme, /'auteur opte pour une approche
optimiste assortie de reserves et de mises en garde.
L'auteur espere que, si la communaute juridique ne
peut pas s'entendre pour faire plus de bien, tout au
moins peut-elle s'accorder pour faire mains de ma/.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On a previous occasion, several years ago, I served as a rapporteur for an
international human rights conference hosted by the University of Calgary, and
produced a paper entitled: "Solidarity or Solipsistic Tunnel Vision: Reminiscences of
a Renegade Rapporteur." 1 I must have done a reasonable job, as once again, I have
been invited to try to pull things together. On this occasion, however, I hope to be less
contentious, less of a juvenile delinquent and to offer a report entitled: "Normative, And
Somewhere to Go?: Reflections on Professional Responsibility."2
To capture the essence of this report, it may be helpful to structure my comments
around a fairly new word: pessoptimism.3 In the course of the conference there have
been frequent references to "the cynics " or "the pessimists." These labels were attached
to those participants who tend to be somewhat sceptical of the roles that modem
lawyers perform, those who tend to believe that the concept of an ethically responsible
lawyer is "oxymoronic." 4 Participants who indulge in such labelling usually do so in
a somewhat critical and distancing way, without, however, naming or labelling their
own perspective. It may be appropriate, at least for heuristic purposes, to conceive of
these other participants as "the optimists." They are, in a sense, "the faithful " in that

R. Devlin, "Solidarity or Solipsistic Tunnel Vision?: Reminiscences of a Renegade Rapporteur"
in K. Mahoney & P. Mahoney, Human Rights in the Twenty First Century: A Global Challenge
(Boston: M. Nijhoff, 1993) 991.
This article is, in part, an implied critique of P. Schlag, "Normative and No Where to Go" (1990)
43 Stan. L. Rev. 167.
I am grateful to Alison Outhit who first suggested this neologism to me. It might also be worth
noting that when I presented this paper at the Conference, due to my accent several members of
the audience thought I was coining yet another "ism": "pissedoffism." Though tempting, it is a
concept I shall leave for another occasion.
See AC. Hutchinson, "Calgary and Everything After: A Postmodern Re-vision of Lawyering"
(1995) 33 Alta. L. Rev. 768.
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they believe in the cause of professionally responsible legal practice and they are
sanguine about the ethical future of the legal profession. The ensuing reflections
straddle, rather uncomfortably, these competing perspectives. Hence the neologism
"pessoptimism."
II. DECONSTRUCTING THE TITLE
The title of this conference is comprised of two components, separated by a colon:
"a new look " and "a national conference on the legal profession and ethics." Each of
these two subcomponents can, I think, be reviewed from both an optimistic and a
pessimistic perspective.
A. A NEW LOOK
The pessimists tend to conceive of the idea of "a new look " as a public relations job,
as an attempt to provide the profession with a better image to counteract quite
widespread public disapproval and disapprobrium about the legal profession.5 They
suggest that the underlying aspiration of a conference such as this is to spruce up the
profession, to brush its hair, polish its teeth and give it a shiny new outfit.Despite (or
perhaps, because of) such "professional apologetics,"6 the pessimists argue that we are
still left with the same petulant spoiled brat. In other words, all talk of a new look and
legal ethics is but a legitimation strategy designed to offset a negative image generated
by several recent high profile scandals (for example, the Lang Michener case), scandals
that could endanger the monopoly position of the profession.7
Optimists are reluctant to adopt such an approach.8 They conceive of the phrase "a
new look" not so much as an attempt to rectify an image problem, but rather as a
process of revision. From an optimistic perspective, the ambition of a conference of this
nature is to re-think, re-analyze and re-interpret the assumptions and norms of legal
practice in all its forms. The suggestion is that perhaps we have been somewhat lax on
See e.g. the proposed role statement of the L.S.U.C. reproduced in C. Curtis, "Alternative Visions
of the Legal Profession in Society: A Perspective on Ontario" (1995) 33 Alta. L. Rev. 787; J.
Watson Hamilton, "Metaphors of Lawyers' Professionalism" (1995) 33 Alta. L. Rev. 833; J. Jaff,
"Law and Lawyers in Pop Music: A Reason for Self-Reflection" (1986) 40 U. Miami L. Rev. 659.
There are also indications of dissatisfaction with the practice of law within the profession. See e.g.
A. Altman, "Modem Litigators and Lawyer Statesmen" (1994) 103 Yale L.J. 1031 at 1033; G.
Giesel, "The Business Client is a Woman: The Effect of Women as In-House Counsel on Women
in Law Firms and the Legal Profession" (1993) 72 Nebr. L. Rev. 760 at 783-86.
W. Pue, "In Pursuit of Better Myth: Lawyers History and History of Lawyers" (1995) 33 Alta. L.
Rev. 730 at 734.
R. Abel, "Toward a Political Economy of Lawyers" (1981) Wis. L. Rev. 1117; H. Arthurs,
"Climbing Kilimanjaro: Ethics for Postmodern Professionals" (1993) 6:1 Westminster Affairs 3
at 6; G. MacKenzie, "Lawyer Discipline and the Independence of the Bar: Can Lawyers Still
Govern Themselves?" (1990) 24 L. Soc. Gaz. 319; G. MacKenzie, Lawyers and Ethics:
Professional Responsibility and Discipline (Toronto: Carswell, 1993); Pue, supra note 6; B.
Wilson, "Pressing Ethical Questions Facing the Legal Profession" (1993) 6: I Westminster Affairs
80.
M. Somerville, "Applying Ethical Standards to Lawyers" (1993) 6:1 Westminster Affairs 11 at 12,
14.
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issues of legal ethics, but that time has now come to re-orient the profession. This
approach is optimistic in the sense that it believes that reform and transformation of the
legal profession are possible. Thus, for example, we have MacKenzie's affirmation of
the impending detailed code in Alberta,9 Garant's celebration of the new protocol on
interjurisdictional practice and its suggested "innovative ethics" provisions, 10 the
proposed role statement of the L.S.U.C., 11 and the call by Mr. Justice Major for more
pro bono work.12
B. A NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON TIIE LEGAL PROFESSION AND ETHICS
In my opinion, probably the most significant word in the latter part of the title is
"ethics." While the conference organizers obviously put a great deal of effort into
convening a forum open to a variety of perspectives on the legal profession and ethics
- perspectives informed by legal history, 13 legal theory, 14 personal experiences of
discrimination and marginalization 15 and official status within professional
organizations 16 - I was quite disappointed that not a lot of attention was focused
upon what is meant by "ethics." By and large the tendency was to consider the meaning
and parameters of "ethics" to be uncontroversial and to proceed without caution. 17 As
a partial corrective to this discursive lacuna, it may be helpful to develop some tentative
thoughts on what ethics might mean and to locate some of the debates that have
occurred during the conference in the context of these reflections on ethics. Once again
the pessimism/optimism dichotomy may serve as a helpful lens through which to filter
these propositions.
Pessimists tend to be wary of ethics talk on both an epistemological and pragmatic
level. Epistemological pessimists tend to conceive of ethics as a cognate of some

JO

II
12

13
14

IS
16
17

G. MacKenzie, "The Valentine's Card in the Operating Room: Codes of Ethics and the Family
Ideals �f the Legal Profession" (199S) 33 Alta. L. Rev. 8S9.
P. Garant, "A Reactionary Looks to the Future" (Address to A New Look: A National Conference
on the Legal Profession and Ethics, Calgary 10 June 1994) [unpublished].
Curtis, supra note S.
J.C. Major, "Lawyer's Obligation to Provide Legal Services" (1995) 33 Alta. L. Rev. 719. But see
contra B. Ballman Jr., "Amended Rule 6.1: Another Move Towards Mandatory Pro Bono? Is That
What We Want?" (1994) 7 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1139; S. Bretz, ''Why Mandatory Pro Bono is a
Bad Idea" (1990) 3 Geo. J. of Legal Ethics 623.
Pue, supra note 6:
Hamilton, supra note S.
0. Pothier, "On Not 'Getting It"' (1995) 33 Alta. L. Rev. 817.
D. McCawley, Address on "Regulation of the Profession" (A New Look: A National Conference
on the Legal Profession and Ethics, Calgary 10 June 1994) [unpublished].
There is, of course, an extensive literature on the nature and function of legal ethics. See e.g. D.
Luban, ed., The Good Lawyer: Lawyers' Roles and Lawyers' Ethics (Totowa, NJ.: Rowman &
Allanheld, 1983); D. Luban, lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1988); T. Shaffer, On Being a Christian Lawyer (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young
University Press, 1981); T. Shaffer, American Lawyers and their Communities: Ethics in the Legal
Profession (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991). For a brief introductory
overview, see C. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics (St. Paul Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1986) at
68-78.
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universalizing truth.18 Drawing on the insights of philosophical relativism, they tend
to dismiss the possibility of Truth - with a capital T - and concomitantly the
possibility of ethical discourse. 19 Pragmatic pessimists tend to look to either history
or sociology and argue that what is important in structuring legal practice is not an
idealist regime of "ethics" but materially driven structural forces.20
Optimists, unsurprisingly, are unwilling fo totally abandon the language of ethics. For
some, legal ethics may be conceived of as a very precise set of rules or codes of
conduct that, like rules of law, can provide guidance for proper action in specific
situations.21 Mimicking the common law regime, the governing ideal of this
perspective is essentially one of inductive logic, and so, in a sense, the more detailed
and precise the rules, the better.22 An alternative optimistic approach is to consider
ethics to be a universalizing and generalizing mode of reflection which, with the
appropriate application of deductive logic, can provide guidance on how to proceed in
moments of doubt. It is thought that the articulation of general principles can provide
a structure of reflection and understanding that can be adopted to precise situations of
moral complexity.23
At this point I want to temporarily bypass the arguments of the pessimists (though
I will return to them in due course) to propose that each of the foregoing optimistic
approaches - the inductive and the deductive - potentially have something to offer
as we discuss the possibility of ethics for the legal profession.24 More specifically, I

IR
19
20

21

22

23

24

Hutchinson, supra note 4.
Schlag, supra note 2.
H. Arthurs, "The Dead Parrot: Does Professional Self Regulation Exhibit Vital Signs?" (1995) 33
Alta. L. Rev. 800; Arthurs, supra note 7; Pue, supra note 6.
F. Zacharias, "Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes: Theory, Practice and the Paradigm
of Prosecutorial Ethics" (1993) 69 Notre Dame L. Rev. 223.
See Law Society of Alberta, Code of Professional Conduct (Calgary: Law Society of Alberta,
1995) [hereinafter Alberta Code].
As Law points out, this is very much the approach adopted by the ABA Canons of Ethics 1908,
and CBA Canons of Legal Ethics 1920. J. Law, "A Code for All Reasons: The 1908 ABA and
1920 CBA Codes of Conduct in Retrospect" (Address to A New Look: A National Conference on
the Legal Profession and Ethics, Calgary IO June 1994) [unpublished). One American commentator
outlines the following six "principles":
Honesty. Don't steal. Bill fairly.
I.
2.
Candor. Tell the truth. Explain the significance of things.
Competence. Know what you are doing and do it well.
3.
4.
Diligence. Work hard and stick to it.
Loyalty. Use your independent professional judgment. Don't allow your own interests
5.
or the interests of others to divert, dilute, or diminish your efforts.
6.
Discretion. Don't gossip. Don't reveal confidential infonnation.
M. Bayles, Professional Ethics (Delmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1981). For a helpful
overview of some of the different moral traditions that might be invoked, see S. Sherwin, No
Longer Patient: Feminist Ethics and Health Care (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992)
at 35-42.
See also G. MacKenzie, supra note 9; and Nussbaum, who calls for "a conception of equitable
judgment that is historically situated, responsive to particular circumstances, and yet committed
to general nonns of justice." in M. Nussbaum, "Scepticism about Practical Reason in Literature
and the Law" (1994) 107 Harv. L. Rev. 714 at 743.
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think that there are two basic points to be made: first, ethical thought is best conceived
of as pluralist and context sensitive; second, ethical commitment entails a belief in
political correctness.
To elaborate: on occasion, some commentators suggest that there is such a thing as
a professional legal ethic that encompasses several specific virtues such as honour,
honesty, integrity, loyalty and neutrality.25 Such an approach advocates a singular
model of the legal professional persona. However, as several participants have argued,
the legal profession is neither monolithic nor homogeneous; it is demographically
diverse,26 stratified in its tasks, and pluralistic iri its functions. 27 Given these
sociological realities, 28 it seems to me that it is more appropriate to abandon singular
(and therefore restrictive) modes of analysis and to approach ethics from the bottom up
rather than from the top down. In other words, what is required is a contextual and
pluralist conception of legal ethics, one that is contingent upon the nature of the
particular "law jobs " in which. a lawyer finds her or himself. 29 Thus, questions of
ethical conduct will depend upon whether one is acting as a litigator or as a counsellor,
in a criminal context or a civil context, in an educational role or a representative role.
Much might also depend upon how sophisticated a client might be, whether she or he
is a "first timer " or a corporate "repeat player." 30 Alberta seems to have moved in the
direction of this complex, multi-tiered and contextually-sensitive approach.3 1
This point about a pluralistic and contextual approach to ethics is helpful in that it
is potentially more pragmatic than the singular and abstracting approach.32 However,
while it is procedurally useful insofar as it locates ethically reflective thought, it
provides little substantive guidance as to how one is to do the right thing. For some,
the answer is obvious: the lawyer should not abuse or take advantage of his or her
client in whichever of the contexts one operates. My own view, however, is that such
a mantra is both simplistic and inadequate. While it provides a necessary component
for professionally responsible conduct, it is not sufficient. Ethics, I suggest, is about
"right living " in all aspects of one's professional life. More precisely, ethical legal
practice has both an internal and an external dimension.
The external dimension is quite obvious: it addresses questions about how one is to
relate to one 's client. As an advisor to, and representative of, one's client, the lawyer

25

26

27
28

29

JO
31
32

AD. Hunter, "A View as to the Profile of a Lawyer in Private Practice" (1995) 33 Alta. L. Rev.
831.
Report of the C.B.A. Task Force on Gender Equality in the Legal Profession, Touchstones for
Change: Equality, Diversity and Accountability (Ottawa: Canadian Bar Association, 1993)
[hereinafter Touchstones].
Arthurs, supra note 20; Curtis, supra note 5; Hutchinson, supra note 4.
See more generally R. Abel & P. Lewis, Lawyers in Society: The Common Law World (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1988).
MacKenzie, Lawyers and Ethics, supra note 7 at 3; S. Sponkin, "The Need for Separate Codes of
Professional Conduct for the Various Specialities" (1993) 7 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 149.
D. Wilkins, "Who Should Regulate Lawyers?" (1992) 105 Harv. L. Rev. 801 at 816-17.
Alberta Code, supra note 22.
Sherwin, supra note 23 at 53, 77.
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should act as a good faith agent.3 3 Now, while this is the familiar realm of
professional responsibility, it is not easy to provide solutions to commonplace problems
such as disclosure of confidential information, 34 conflict of interest scenarios 35 or
more controversial issues such as cross-examination of a complainant in sexual assault
situations or whistle blowing. 36
The internal dimension is less obvious in the sense that, historically, it has not been
conceived of as an issue of professional ethics. Basically, the internal dimension
addresses the question of the lawyer's relationship with others with whom he or she
comes into contact in his or her professional role. It asks: how do I, as a lawyer, treat
my clients, my colleagues, my employees? Are the norms and mores of my professional
interaction premised upon, and enforcing of, attitudes that are dominating and
exploitative?37 In other words, it asks: do I contribute to an environment in which,
inter alia, classism, racism, sexism, homophobia and abilism are accepted and
tolerated?38 More challenging still, it forces us to consider whether we are aware of the
interaction of different forms of domination and exclusion.39 For example, what efforts
do we pursue in attempting to understand and respond to the specific circumstances of
a disabled woman or a gay First Nations person?
For some, this turn to an internal interrogation of professional norms and mores may
go too far. It may be understood as being a form of moralistic interventionism or even
political correctness.40 It may be perceived and construed as an unwarranted
infringement of the rights of the autonomous lawyer to exercise his or her free choice
to run a practice as she or he might wish.4 1 In short, some might claim that such an
expanded conception of "professional responsibility " renders the phenomenon

33
34

35

36

37

38

39
40

41

B. Smith, Professional Conduct for Canadian Lawyers (Toronto: Butterworths, 1989).
See e.g. G. Grenier, "Solicitor-Client Privilege and the Ontario Loan and Trust Corporations Act"
(1989) 1 5 Can. Bus. L.J. 129.
G. Steele, "Imputing Knowledge from One Member of a Firm to Another: 'Lead us Not into
Temptation"' ( 1 991) 1 2 Advocates Q. 46; P. Moser, "Chinese Walls: A Means of Avoiding Law
Firm Disqualification When a Personally Disqualified Lawyer Joins the Firm" (l 990) 3 Geo. J.
Legal Ethics 399. MacKenzie proposes that detailed rules should be adopted to provide lawyers
with guidance in such issues (Lawyers and Ethics, supra note 7). See also Wolfram, supra note
17, C. 6, 7, 8.
R. Cramton, "The Lawyer as Whistleblower: Confidentiality and the Government Lawyer" (1991)
S Geo. J. Legal Ethics 291; Wolfram, ibid. at 666.
For discussions of this point, see M. Harrington, Women Lawyers: Rewriting the Rules (New York:
A.A. Knopf, 1 994).
W. Baker, "Structµre of the Workplace or Should we Continue to Knock the Comers off the
Square Pegs or Can we Change the Shape of the Holes?" (1995) 33 Alta. L. Rev. 82 1 ; Curtis,
supra note S; MacKenzie, Lawyers and Ethics, supra note 7 at 25-24; Touchstones, supra note 26.
Pothier, supra note 1 5 ; Touchstones, ibid.
My own view is that, despite the reactionary rhetoric, it is both acceptable and desirable to be
politically correct, particularly if one is a lawyer. It seems to me that as professionals who seek
to connect ourselves to justice we should seek to do the correct thing - and to take proper
political stances to support our moral vision. Who, in good conscience, would want to act against
their moral principles? Literally, why would you want to do the wrong thing, or be politically
incorrect?
Curtis, supra note S.
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unrecognizable. Others may invoke the familiar refrain that academics may be good at
critique but have little to offer by way of alternatives.
In response to these concerns, the next section will outline the parameters of an
ethical vision that, in my opinion, provides some direction for legal practice.
III. RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL ETHICS
The reconstructive ethical vision advanced in this section is comprised of three basic
elements: the "talent" of critical self-reflexivity; the maxim to act responsibly; and the
injunction to do no harm 42 - each of which can provide an angle on some of the
presentations and debates that have occurred in the course of this conference.
A. PRINCIPLE OF CRITICAL SELF-REFLEXIVITY
As human beings who seek to do our jobs, to operate efficiently, to make a living
and to sleep at night, we necessarily have a vested interest in believing that we are
doing the right thing. However, at times there is danger of complacency, passivity, and
routinization that can lead to "conceptual limitations of vision," 43 or a sort of moral
numbness. Certain patterns of professional conduct are so taken for granted that they
may become entrenched and, therefore, unquestionable.
The principle of critical self-reflexivity works on the assumption that nothing is
infallible and that everything is potentially up for grabs.44 It serves as a sort of ethical
"pin prick" and encourages each of us to become conscious of the particular, partial,
partisan and necessarily incomplete nature of our own self-perceptions. The principle
of critical self-reflexivity suggests that each of us should do a "double take " on our
assumptions, beliefs and conduct, to consider what possible gaps or failures might
permeate our thinking and our practices. In other words, it demands that we build into
both our analyses and conduct processes of ongoing self-recognition and that we foster
a stronger disposition for humility and a greater openness to possible criticisms. An
example might be that we advocates of the adversarial common law system could

42

43
44

Others have also discussed aspects of each of these ideas but none, I think, have put them together
in quite the same way as I suggest. See e.g. S. Allegretti, "Shooting Elephants, Serving Clients:
An Essay on George Orwell and the Lawyer-Client Relationship" (1993) Creighton L. Rev. l ; N.
Cahn, "A Preliminary Feminist Critique of Legal Ethics" (1990) 4 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 23; D.
Kennedy, "The Responsibility of Lawyers for the Justice of their Causes" (l 987) 18 Tex. Tech.
L. Rev. 1157; M. Nussbaum, supra note 24; S. Pepper, "Autonomy, Community and Lawyers'
Ethics" (1 990) 19 Capital U. L. Rev. 939; D. Rhode, "Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice"
(1985) 37 Stan. L. Rev. 589; W. Simon, "The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and
Professional Ethics" (1978) Wis. L. Rev. 30; W. Simon, "Ethical Discretion in Lawyering" (1988)
101 Harv. L. Rev. 1083.
See Pothier, supra note 15.
See generally R.M. Unger, Social Theory, its Situation and its Task (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1987).
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consider backing off from imposing our culturally specific legal norms and processes
on First Nations peoples. 45
More schematically, the principle of critical self-reflexivity might operate at both the
macro and micro levels of the Canadian legal system. For example, at the macro level
it might engender the following sorts of questions: is the practice of law complicitous
in, or legitimizing of, patterns of inequality in Canadian society? Specifically, who
tends to get access to law school, law jobs, and the "pick of the crop" opportunities
within the profession? 46 Are the assumptions that underpin contemporary legal practice
as secure as we have traditionally believed? For example, is the adversarial model
necessarily the most desirable route to follow given the radical diversity of legal
problems in modem society?47 Are the traditional norms and standards for the
evaluation of the legal profession sufficient to meet the needs of contemporary
Canadian society? Do we need supplementary norms such as the desiderata of greater
inclusion and the minimization of inequality? 48 Do we have an equitable distribution
of legal resources in Canadian society?49 Have there been information or market
failures or negative externalities that have resulted in a dysfunctional or inefficient
allocation of our legal wealth?50 If so, what sort of correctives can be developed? Is
self-regulation by a monopoly really defensible on principled, practical or historical
grounds?51
If all of these concerns seem to be so grand as to be imponderable, perhaps we can
adopt the environmentalist slogan "think globally, act locally" to consider the
application of the principle of self-reflexivity at the micro level of legal practice. First,
this might suggest that each of us should consider the way in which the privilege of
legal knowledge confers upon us social power. In tum, we might then want to question
whether we use that dynamic of power/knowledge appropriately when we work with

45

46

47

48

49

so
SI

L. Chartrand, "The Appropriateness of the Lawyer as Advocate i n Contemporary Aboriginal
Justice Initiatives" (1995) 33 Alta. L. Rev. 874. See also D. Kleinberger, "Wanted: An Ethos of
Personal Responsibility - Why Codes of Ethics and Schools of Law Don't Make for Ethical
Lawyers" (1989 ) 21 Con. L. Rev. 365 at 367-68, for a review of the criticisms of the adversarial
model more generally.
Giesel, supra note 5, reviews the extensive American literature raising these concerns. In the
Canadian context, · see C. Tennant, "Discrimination in the Legal Profession, Codes of Professional
Conduct and the Duty of Non-Discrimination" (1992) 1 5 Dalhousie L.J. 464; Touchstones, supra
note 26.
D. Ginn, "Wife Assault, the Justice System and Professional Responsibility" (1995) 33 Alta. L.
Rev. 9 08; Simon, "Ideology," supra note 42.
J. Dooley & E. Wood, "Opening the Courthouse Door: The Americans with D isabilities Act's
Impact on the Courts" (June-July 1992) 7 6 Jud. 39; Pothier, supra note I 5; Touchstones, supra
note 26.
See Major, supra note 1 2.
D. Rhode, "Why the ABA Bothers: A Functional Perspective on Professional Codes" (1981) 59
Tex. L. Rev. 689 at 7 1 6.
Arthurs, supra note 20; Rhode, ibid. at 7 1 8; B. Stephenson, "The Social Contract of a Self
Governing Profession" (1980) 1 4 L. Soc. Gaz. 255:
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our clients or whether we use it as a way to dominate them.52 Moreover, the principle
of critical self-reflexivity might encourage us to reconsider the norms of our work
environments and the particular roles that we find ourselves in as partners, associates,
judges, clerks, students, professors, employees, employers and colleagues.
It is, of course, always easier to espouse the principle of self-reflexivity than it is to
embrace it. To incorporate self-reflexivity into our lives and practices is a profound
challenge. On one level, many of us are so busy that we cannot imagine second
guessing our normal assumptions because the result, we fear, might be chaos. On
another level, it is painful to be told that individually and as a profession we are elitist,
racist, abilist, classist and sexist. It is disturbing to realize that one's chosen profession
may be part of the problem, when all along we thought that we were part of the
solution.53 It is simply too exhausting to lose sleep at night pondering these questions
when we have been hosting some potential clients for dinner and our daybook indicates
a 7:00 a.m. power breakfast for the next morning. However, it seems to me that if one
genuinely aspires to be more than a mere technical automaton or to have any pretence
of being involved in a profession that holds itself out as closely connected to justice,
then the principle of critical self-reflexivity is a minimal moral imperative.
In short, the principle of critical self-reflexivity is supplementary in that it advocates
different analyses, focuses on different problems and frequently proposes different
answers from those generated by conventional wisdom about professional
responsibility.54 In a sense, it can be understood as a form of consciousness-raising
and, as such, it destabilizes our "right not to know." 55 Most importantly, the principle
of critical self-reflexivity encourages us to reconsider the power that we as a profession
possess. It helps us to remember that the professional is the political.
B. ACT RESPONSIBLY
While the principle of critical self-reflexivity may serve as a minimal moral
imperative, it is, I fear, excessively procedural and therefore a little too minimal. One
may practice critical self-reflexivity and still decide to act in what I would suggest is
an unethical way. All that critical self-reflexivity would achieve is an awareness of the
significance of one's acts. Changed consciousness is not chan_ged circumstances.
J

52
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Chartrand, supra note 45; Hutchins on, supra note 4; G. Lo pez, Rebellious Lawyering: One
Chicano 's Vision of Progressive Law Practice (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press , 1992); Pepper,
supra note 42 at 949, 955; D. Rosenthal, Lawyer and Client: Who's in Charge? ( New York:
Russell Sape Foundation, 1 974). Sexual relations with a client are an obvious example.
I t s hould be pointed out, however, that unlike many other professions, the legal community is at
leas t asking questions about discrimination in the profession, and in this sense can be seen to be
manifes ting some of the virtues of self-reflexivity. See e.g. Touchstones, supra note 26.
Several commentators have sugges ted that female lawy ers tend to have a different moral vision
than male lawyers. See e.g. R. Jack & D. Crowley Jack, Moral Vision and Professional Decisions:
The Changing Values of Women and Men Lawyers (Cambridge: Cambridge Univers ity Press,
1989); C. Menkel-Meadow, " Portia in a Different Voice: Some Speculations on a Women's
Lawyering Process" (1985) I Berkeley Women's L.J. 39.
B. Feldthusen, "The Gender Wars: 'Where the Boys Are"' (1990) 4 Can. J. Women & L. 66 at
71.
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Therefore, I would argue that the principle of critical self-reflexivity also needs to be
supplemented with some substantive content: the proposition to act responsibly.
As North American lawyers, we are ensconced in a tradition that puts a very high
value on individualism, liberty and freedom. More specifically, there is a tendency to
priorize rights thinking and to encode much social interaction and conflict in a rights
discourse. In the context of this conference, two aspects of rights thinking may be
pertinent: clients' rights and lawyers' rights.
The idea of client's rights dovetails with the lawyerly ethos of zealous
representation.56 That is, conventional professional wisdom argues that the client (as
principal) has absolute priority and that it is the duty of the lawyer (as agent) to
represent that client to the full extent of her or his capacities without, however, either
in perception or reality, ever actually identifying with that particular client. The
assumptions underlying "this Principle of Nonaccountability" 57 are threefold: first, that
client autonomy is the paradigm value; 58 second, that judgments by lawyers in relation
to a client are both premature and partisan; and third, that distance is essential to ensure
rational conduct.59 The result, to put it crassly, is the "hired gun," 60 or to be more
polite, the "neutral partisanship." 6 1
The idea of lawyers' rights arises out of a commingling of at least two assumptions:
the belief that a lawyer, like everyone else, has a right to make a living doing what she
or he does best; 62 and the idea that the protection of such a lawyerly right serves the
public good of ensuring that everyone will have access to legal representation, because
lawyers will not be unwilling to represent "unpopular " clients.63
There is no doubt that rights discourse is an important social achievement and that
arguments in favour of both lawyers' and clients' rights carry a great deal of weight.
However, we must be careful not to get carried away with the rhetoric of rights. An
excessive emphasis on rights can induce a form of professional tunnel vision.
56

57

59

60

61
62
63

See e.g. Law Society of Alberta, Professional Conduct Handbook (Calgary: Law Society of
Alberta, 1 983) at 27:
When acting as an advocate the lawyer must, while treating the tribunal with courtesy
and respect, represent his [sic] client resolutely, honourably, and within the limits of the
law.
See also J. Law, supra note 23 for a further discussion of the idea of zealous representation.
Murray Schwartz has probably stated this position most succinctly: "When acting as an advocate...
a lawyer is neither legally, professionally nor morally accountable for the means used or the ends
achieved." M. Schwartz, "The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers" (1 978) 66 Cal. L.
Rev. 669 at 673.
S. Pepper, "The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defence, A Problem, and Some Possibilities"
(1986) Am. Bar Found. Res. J. 613.
Kleinberger, supra note 45. at 370-7 1 .
M. Freedman, "The Lawyer as a Hired Gun" in A. Gerson, ed., Lawyer's Ethics: Contemporary
Dilemmas (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Inc., 1 980) 63.
Rhode, supra note 42 at 605; Simon, "Ideology," supra note 42 at 36-37.
Rhode, ibid. at ·610.
Major, supra note 1 2. Rhode, however, argues that in the American context the legal profession
has repeatedly failed to represent unpopular causes. Rhode, ibid. at 630.
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Specifically, by exclusively highlighting the lawyer-client relationship, the broader
context in which we as a profession operate may be obscured, rendering our conduct
disconnected from the broader community. 64
To my mind, the practice of law is not a right; rather it is a socially conferred
privilege.To be a lawyer is to be a trustee not just for the interests of individual clients,
but also for the interests of the broader society. If this is so, greater attention must be
focused on the responsible fulfilment of this socially conferred trust. Consequently, it
is not adequate to fetishize rights to justify a "my hands are clean" argument. Rather,
as public trustees, lawyers must recognize their social responsibilities and be
accountable for their conduct.65 Thus, as we perform our various legal practices, not
only must we ask the unavoidable question of what the client's rights are, but also the
parallel question of what the ramifications of our conduct and strategies are for the
broader society. Lawyers who advise clients on environmental issues might be an
obvious example as might criminal defence lawyers in sexual assault trials.
C. DO NO HARM
While the proposition to act responsibly adds some substantive bite to the principle
of critical self-reflexivity, it is still too abstracted. Therefore, as a third side to this
ethical triad I would suggest that lawyers consider the maxim: do no harm with your
legal skills or in the operation of your legal practice.
On one level this would easily translate into the banal imperative to do no harm to
your client: pay attention to your job, don't over-bill, maintain confidences and don't
steal the trust funds. A more ambitious, expansive and controversial application of the
maxim would, however, counsel that lawyers should not use their legal skills to harm
others in society, beyond their clients.66 This would mean that, while lawyers have a
responsibility to pursue the interests of their clients, they cannot go so far that their
conduct would cause harm to others. The challenge of such a maxim becomes obvious
when it is counterposed with one of the classic statements of the lawyer' s role, Lord
Brougham's proposition in the Queen Caroline divorce trial, that:
An advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the world, and that person is
his client. To serve that client by all means and expedients and all hazards and costs to other persons,
and among them, to himself, is his first and only duty; and in performing this duty, he must not regard
the alarm, the torments and the destruction which he may bring upon others.[sic)61
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Major, ibid.
M. Eberts, "Representing Unpopular Interests in the 1 990s" (1 993 Wickwire Lecture, Dalhousie
Law School, 1 5 November 1993) [unpublished]; Hutchinson, supra note 4.
E. Torphy-Donzella, "Products Liability Litigation and Third Party Harm: The Ethics of
Nondisclosure" (1991) 5 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 435 provides one forum for a discussion of such an
idea.
G. Hazard, Jr. & 0. Rhode, The Legal Profession: Responsibility and Regulation, 3d ed.
(Westburg, N.Y.: The Foundation Press, 1 994) at" 1 36-37 [emphasis added).
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This expansive and inclusive conception of "do no harm " is premised on the idea that,
as social beings and citizens, we are part of an interdependent web of relationships that
generates responsibilities to others beyond those with whom we directly interact.This
principle of non-maleficence68 suggests that we should be more empathetic in our
practices to recognize that we owe a duty of care not just to our clients, but also to
others who we can reasonably foresee will be harmed by our practices. To the extent
that the proposition "do no harm " is tortious and communitarian · rather than
contractualist and individualistic, it may prompt us towards "compassionate immersion
and non-indifference."69
To be clear, however, this is not an attempt to impose a "stifling despotism of
virtue " 70 where "mercenaries for hire " are transformed into "missionaries for
justice. "7 1 It is not proposed that lawyers put other interests ahead of their clients'.
Rather the proposition is more modest: work in your client's best interest but only up
to the threshold of not harming others. It is not an invocation to do good; it is an
exhortation not to do wrong. 72
68
69
70
71
72

Tosh Hayashi has brought this way of phrasing the issue to my attention.
Nussbaum, supra note 24 at 744.
R.M. Unger, "The Critical Legal Studies Movement" (1986) 103 Harv. L. Rev. 561 at 641.
Rhode, supra note 42 at 632.
Negotiation strategies might be a fruitful area of analysis. See e.g. T. Guernsey, "Truthfulness in
Negotiation" (1982) 17 U. Richmond L. Rev. 99. An obvious response to this suggesti9n is that
not every lawyer will adopt such a stance, and that those who are less ethically motivated will
service those clients who want a "hired gun," thereby free-riding in this new "ethical economy."
Gordon and Simon identify this potential problem and respond to it in the following manner:
Here the image is of a "race to the bottom" in which moral entrepreneurs
will undercut others in a competitive process that will push standards down
to their least common denominator.
To the extent that clients shop for lawyers in terms of their willingness to
do the clients' bidding, there is some reality to this view. But to the extent
that clients value high ethical standards in lawyers, the view ignores
countervailing pressures. Clients might value high ethical standards in
lawyers because they themselves have such standards and prefer to associate
with people who share their views. They may value high standards because
they believe such standards are associated with an especially sophisticated
type of legal judgment that is less likely to sacrifice the client's long-term
interests to short-term gain. They may value them because association with
lawyers with a reputation for high standards lends the client valuable status
or credibility with third parties with whom the client has to deal.
If high standards have economic value in this sense, lawyers have practical
reasons to institutionalize them through organizations like bar associations
and to give them credibility by conferring powers to certify and enforce
them on such associations. Thus, one might imagine a "race to the top" in
which entrepreneurs make their services more attractive by associating them
with a credible reputation for high ethical standards, thus creating
competitive pressures for others to follow suit. As more lawyers follow suit,
association with those who do not will carry an increasingly costly stigma
that deters clients and marginalizes this type of practice. Of course, this
vision is no more plausible than the "race to the bottom." It seems likely that
any market for legal services will involve pressures pushing ethical standards
in many directions. The point is that these conflicting pressures may leave
ambitious lawyers some room for institutional innovation that furthers their
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IV. LOCATING LEGAL ETHICS
I think that the foregoing review suggests two things: first, that it is possible to talk
about ethics and to outline some procedural and substantive ethical guidelines; and
second, that ethics are plural and diversified, contingent upon the nature of the law job
involved. In this section, I will attempt to .locate the ethical triad of "critical self
reflexivity, " "responsibility " and "do no harm " in the context of several different aspects
of the legal profession, while drawing upon several of the presentations and debates that
have surfaced in the last few days. A connecting theme for the ensuing suggestions is
that ethical lawyering is like a muscle: it can be toned through regular exercise, or it
can atrophy through disuse.73
A. LEGAL EDUCATION
Legal education, not only in law schools but also in the form of CLE, is an obvious
and important location for a consideration of questions of professional responsibility.74 ·
There are, of course, the debates about what is the best way to structure professional
responsibility courses and the contentious question of whether or not they should be
mandatory.75 But I think it is important to emphasize that legal educators need to
conceive of professional responsibility expansively and critically and not just to
consider it as a forced march through codes of conduct. For example, as teachers we
must emphasize that much professional misconduct is not just moral laxity, but a form
of white collar crime. Moreover, as professors, we have to take responsibility for
questions of access to legal education,76 for what we choose to teach and for what we
choose not to teach, 77 for how we teach and the ways we create safer or more hostile
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77

ethical ideals .
R. Gordon & W. Simon, "The Redemption of Professionalism" in R. Nelson et al., eds., Lawyers '
Ideals/Lawyers' Practices: Transformations in the American Legal Profession (Ithaca: Cornell
Univers ity Press, 1992 ) 230 at 245.
This theme is sugges ted, indirec tly, by D. Kennedy, "Rebels from Principle: Changing the
Corporate Law Firm from Within" (Fall 1981) Harvard Law School Bulletin 36 at 39. While
developing this metaphor, I have wondered (in a self-refl exive way) whether it is potentially
abilis t. Having discussed it with s everal colleagues, I don't think it is , but I am not completely
sure. Therefore, because I believe it is a helpful metaphor, I have dec ided to use it.
W. Cotter, Professional Responsibility Instruction in Canada: A Coordinated Curriculum for Legal
Education (Montreal: Conceptc om, 1992 ).
A. Es au, "Teaching Professional Responsibility in Law School" (1988) 11 Dalhousie L.J. 403.
R. Devlin, "Towards An/other Legal Education: Some Tentative Critical and Tentative Proposals
to Confront the Racism of Modem Legal Education" (1989) 38 U.N.B.L.J. 89; R. Devlin & A.W.
MacKay, "An Ess ay on Institutional Responsibility: The Indigenous Black and Mic mac Programme
at Dalhous ie Law Sc hool" (1 991 ) 14 Dalhousie L.J. 296; Touchstones, supra note 26.
For example, in c onjunction with the IBM programme, Dalhousie Law Sc hool has set in place a
process of c ours e revision to ensure that our teac hing materials are more inclusive of diversity.
Many professors have not attempted to incorporate such materials. I t should also be noted that
some of thes e materials, the point of whic h was to address racial discrimination, were reproduc ed
i n a barely legible way therefore making them quite inaccessible to visually impaired s tudents .
This poignant example of "s till not getting it" was brought to my attention by Professor D. Pothier.
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environments,78 and for the implicit messages which we convey through our
teaching.79 Furthermore, law teachers might want to consider making it a requirement
that students fulfil some public service prior to graduation. 80 The desired aim
throughout, I would suggest, is to be prophylactic: to help students identify problematic
assumptions and practices, not so much to create moral fibre (for that is an impossible
task) but to encourage a environment hospitable to its growth. My colleague Wayne
MacKay dealt with some of these issues more eloquently than 1.81
B. LAW STUDENTS
Many of the debates around professional responsibility tend to treat students as
objects of discussion and therefore as essentially passive. Students, however, are active
members of the legal community and also have much to contribute to the questions of
professional responsibility. Two comments are all that I have time for in this report.
First, it seems to me that it is important for students to realize that legal education is
a social privilege and not an (inherited) right. One consequence of this could be that
"mainstream students" might cease their complaining about the unfairness of "equity"
initiatives at many Canadian law schools. Second, although times are tough, law
students still represent a very privileged and quite. "marketable" sub-community. This
enables law students as a group to have some social power and to consider whether
they can exercise that power in an ethically responsible way. To take one example,
during the late 1 980s, elite law students in the United States boycotted a major law firm
because it was the legal representative of South African Airlines. The strategy
contributed to the firm terminating its relationship with the South African
government.82 Could such a campaign be organized in relation to equity issues in
Canada, given the fact that many private law firms are refusing to even open the door?
C. LAWYERS
Lawyers, as both members of a professional community and individuals, obviously
encounter many ethical questions. As a community, a collective commitment could be
made to allocate a specific amount of our resources to pro bono work,83 or we could
accept the LSUC proposed rule on non-discrimination.84 As individuals, we could
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R. Devlin, "Legal Education as Political Consciousness-Raising or Paving the Road to Hell" (1989)
39 J. Legal Educ. 213. See also D. Herman, "Legal Education, Feminism and the 'Well Intentioned
Man': A Response to Richard Devlin" ( 1990) 40 J. Legal Educ. 257; Touchstones, supra note 26.
E. Dvorkin, J. Himmelstein & H. Lesnick, Becoming a Lawyer: A Humanistic Perspective on
Legal Education and Professionalism (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1981).
R. Smith, "Legal Utopia and Myopia: Some Comments Regarding Shiffrin, Lipkin and Looking
Beyond the Mark in Legal Education" {1990) 1 9 Cap. U.L. Rev. 1059 at 1085. Sarat reports, for
example, that 70 percent of the students who enter Harvard Law School wanted to practice public
interest law, but only 2 percent actually do: A. Sarat, "Law's Two Lives: Humanist Visions and
Professional Education" ( 1 993) 5 Yale J. L. & Human. 201 at 203.
A.W. MacKay, "Some Thoughts on a More Humanist and Equitable Legal Education" (1995) 33
Alta. L. Rev. 920.
Simon, "Ethical," supra note 42 at 1 1 30; Kennedy, supra note 42 at 1 1 58.
Major, supra note 12.
Curtis, supra note 5.
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reconsider how we run our daily practices to analyze the ways in which we are
exclusive and dominating. As potential remedies, we might encourage employment
equity and mentoring as possibilities. 85 We might also want to rethink the ways in
which we interact with our clients. Instead of considering them as merely fountains for
billable hours, we could encourage them to pursue self-help and empowerment rather
than dependence. Or, we could drop the pretence of "agnosticism" and "studied
neutrality"86 and suggest to clients that, while what they propose to do would be legal,
it would be "conduct unbecoming" a lawyer to pursue such a strategy as it harms other
members of society.87 Finally, if we are in relatively senior positions in a law firm (for
example, a partner), we could promote procedures to recognize and value the pro bona
efforts of the lawyers who work with us,88 or implement parental leave policies and
flexible work schedules.89
D. JUDGES
Judges, as the elite of the profession, are particularly well situated to provide ethical
leadership. They could accept that bias does in fact exist in the court system 90 and
embrace rather than trash judicial education programs that are designed to promote
equity in the legal system.91 Moreover, as leaders of the profession, they could
acknowledge rather than deny that on occasion there is inappropriate judicial conduct
and that a modernized and more nuanced disciplinary process is desirable and
necessary. 92 In the courtroom, judges could restrict some of the excesses of the
adversary system. Examples might include modified procedures when aboriginal
persons are involved93 or the curtailment of excessively adversarial tactics in cases
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Ibid.; Watson Hamilton, supra note 5; Major, supra note 12; Touchstones, supra note 26.
Rhode, supra note 42 at 621.

For those who have a penchant for precedent, it has been said that Abraham Lincoln, as a young
lawyer, advised a potential client as follows:
Yes, we can doubtless gain your case for you; we can set a whole neighbourhood at
loggerheads; we can distress a widowed mother and her six fatherless children and
thereby get you six hundred dollars to which you seem to have a legal claim, but which
rightfully belongs, it appears to me, as much to the woman and her children as it does
to you. You must remember that some things legally right are not morally right. We
shall not take your case, but will give you a little advice for which we will charge you
nothing. You seem to be a sprightly, energetic man; we would advise you to try your
hand at making six hundred dollars in some other way.
D. Luban, "The Lysistratian Prerogative: A Response to Stephen Pepper" (1986) Am. Bar Found.
Res. J. '637.
Major, supra note 12.
Baker, supra note 38; A. Rauhala, "Making Room for Lawyers with Children" Globe and Mail
(21 July 1 993) A2; K. Selick, "Why Should Law Firms Subsidize Mums?" Globe and Mail (19
July 1993) A l 3; Touchstones, supra note 26.
K. Czapanskiy, "Gender Bias in the Courts: Social Change Strategies" (1990) 4 Geo. J. Legal
Ethics 1; Giesel, supra note 5 at 780; J.A. Levine, "Preventing Gender Bias in the Courts: A
Question of Judicial Ethics" (1988) 1 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 775; Touchstones, supra note 26.
The initiatives of the Western Judicial Education Centre are helpful in this regard.
But see contra C. Schmitz, "Judges 'strongly' opposed to C.B.A. plan for Judicial Discipline
Reforms" Lawyers' Weekly (16 September 1994) 1 at 43.
Chartrand, supra note 45.
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involving violence against women.94 In the latter context, at a very minimum, judges
could ensure that they and their peers stop blaming the victim. 95 On a different tack,
judges could be more hospitable to malpractice suits brought against members of the
legal profession.96
E. BENCHERS
Benchers, as the embodied custodians of the conscience of the legal profession, have
perhaps the greatest responsibility to go beyond the rhetoric of professional ethics, "to
walk their talk." 97 The most significant opportunity and test for determining this
possibility revolves around the question of self-regulation. As I interpret the evidence,
it appears that self-regulation has not worked sufficiently well to satisfy public
needs.98 Moreover, despite the fact that the law societies are (theoreticalJy) meant to
protect "the public interest," that hardly appears to be the viewpoint of many of their
members who, to the contrary, see law societies as protectors of the profession's
parochial interests.99 Consequently, I would encourage benchers to consider "a system
of multiple controls 11100 where justice is not only done but is manifestly seen to be
done. Various options might include: review by judges, review by an ombudsperson,
empowered lay representation, regulatory controls and greater openness to tortious,
contractual and fiduciary actions.1 01 In particular, assistance might be garnered from
Quebec's Office des Professions.102 At an absolute m.inimum, as Wilkins points out,
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Ginn, supra note 47.
Ibid.
R. Anderson & W. Steele, "Fiduciary Duty, Tort and Contract: A Primer on the Legal Malpractice
Puzzle" (1 994) 47 S.M.U. L. Rev. 235; I. Miller, "Breaking the Written Code of Silence in Legal
Malpractice Settlements" (1992) 6 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 187.
Hutchinson, supra note 4; MacKay, supra note 8 1 .
Arthurs, supra note 20; D. Kleinberger, supra note 4 5 at 366-67; R. Laperriere, "L'Ethique et la
Responsibilitie Professionnelle des Juristes En Matiere de Competance" (1995) 33 Alta. L. Rev.
882; Law, supra note 23; G. Mew, "Lawyers: The Agony and the Ecstasy of Self-Government"
(1 989) 9 Windsor Yearb. Access to Justice 210; Rhode, supra note 50 at 692-706; Wilkins, supra
note 30 at 866-67.
Curtis, supra note 5. Curtis makes the point that benchers no longer are comprised of "elder
statesmen and are now more like representatives of different constituencies (within the legal
profession]" at 790. To my mind, this is an improvement for two reasons. First, it represents a
move from feudalism to democracy within the profession. Second, the shift makes it apparent that
benchers are representatives of the profession and therefore that the interests of the general public
need to be protected by a system of checks and balances beyorid those of the internal regulatory
mechanisms of the profession. See also Arthurs, supra note 7; Watson Hamilton, supra note 5 ;
Pue, supra note 6.
Wilkins, supra note 30.
Anderson & Steele, supra note 96; American Bar Association Commission on Evaluation of
Disciplinary Enforcement, Lawyer Regulation for a New Century (Chicago: American Bar
Association, 1992); Pue, supra note 6; Wilkins, ibid. Undoubtedly each of the suggested options
has its own problems. It is beyond the scope of this paper to canvass their various strengths and
weaknesses. My argument is that it is desirable to assess such possibilities rather than simply
refusing point blank to contemplate any change in the status quo.
Y.M. Morrissette, "Address on Alternative Visions of Legal Professionals in Society" (Address to
A New Look: A National Conference on the Legal Profession and Ethics, Calgary I O June 1994)
[unpublished].
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"enforcement proceedings should presumptively be open and accessible to ensure that
information about the conduct in question and the standards being applied can be
reviewed and critiqued." 103
F. LEGISLATURES
While there is much to be done within the profession, responsibility does not rest
with the profession alone. In light of the failures of the legal marketplace, corrective
interventions might well be required by the legislatures. For example, given the
apparent intransigence of the profession on improved regulation, perhaps the time is
ripe for the creation of autonomous review mechanisms for alleged misfeasances.1 04
Alternatively, steps could be taken towards curtailing the profession's monopoly over
access to legal services.105 More ambitiously, socialized law might be an appropriate
approach, for example, through the fostering of prepaid legal services 106 and enhanced
funding for legal aid.107 At a minimum, lawyers who do legal aid work ought to be
promptly paid.108
G. SUMMARY
To summarize, in this section I have attempted to develop two arguments. The first
is that responsibility for the improvement of legal services lies primarily (but not
exclusively) with those who are within the system, not with outsiders. Far too often
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Wilkins, supra note 30 at 884.
Rhode, supra note 50 at 72 1 .
A rather nice example of this intransigence occurred in my own law school as I worked on a
final draft of this essay. Dalhousie has a first year course entitled "Orientation to Law" in which
professors give 90 minute lectures on an area of particular interest to them. Students are
subsequently interviewed by faculty members who quiz them on the various presentations made.
To provide a common base for evaluation each professor provides several questions and suggested
answers. A prominent member of the Nova Scotia Bar (who also attended this Conference) gave
the lecture on Professional Responsibility, and provided the following questions and answers:
1 . What are the essential obligations of all Law Societies?
[Answer: Admitting lawyers to the profession, setting standards for lawyers to follow,
disciplining lawyers who get into trouble.]
2. Why is it important that the legal profession remain independent?
[Answer: Only a profession which is free from the threat of Government interference can
fairly argue against the State and preserve the rights and privileges of individuals in the
State.]
3. In whose interest does the legal profession govern itself?
[Answer: The primary goal of all Law Societies is to self govern the legal profession in
the public interest.]
For a powerful demolition of such doctrinaire arguments, see Pue, supra note 6.
Simon, "Ideology," supra note 42 at 1 4 1 ; S. Thom, "What to do about Paralegals" (March 1993)
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power holders resist change by continually deferring responsibility to those who are
excluded. This is the familiar "What's the problem? Prove it! Can you do it for us,
please?" response. While we should not ignore what is being said by the communities
which we serve and should do whatever is feasible to enhance their input, the processes
of renewal and revision can (with just a little imagination and good will) be set in place
immediately. My second proposition is that the time has now come to stop considering
legal ethics as simply a "private" moral code internal to the profession and to
reconceive them as enforceable "public" norms. A cloistered aristocracy is an
anachronism in an egalitarian and democratic society.
V. CONCLUSION
By way of conclusion, I want return to the neologism of pessoptimism. The structure
of my analysis and the substance of my comments have, in the main, emphasized the
optimistic dimension of the equation. I have suggested that a serious pursuit of
professional ethics requires reflection and reorientation pn many different fronts: on the
micro level and the macro level, in the structure of the legal profession and in our
individual characters. Rather than yearning for a mythical "golden age of
professionalism," I have attempted to argue that we should be open-minded and forward
looking in our planning. Conversations such as those generated by this conference
signify that some progress is, perhaps, being made.
But, at the same time, I think that it would be an error to get too starry-eyed by
resting my report on idealistic voluntarism. I have two reservations: first, my sense of
the inevitable tells me that debates about professional ethics are fine on a Saturday
afternoon, but on Monday morning it will all seem very naive, or at best, something to
be put on the back burner. As many participants (both optimistic and pessimistic) have
pointed out, a major problem is that the provision of legal services is less about
providing reflective and skilful advice, than it is ·about the selling of a commodity.109
Contemporary legal practice does not focus on the needs of a client; rather it focuses
on time. Such an approach priorizes efficiency and wealth maximization over quality
and care. The result is that many of us in the legal community suffer from a sort of
double consciousness: on the one hand, we espouse the virtues of professionally
responsible behaviour; yet, on the other hand, due to pressing practical demands, we
have neither the time nor the energy to mobilize processes that would be conducive to
fostering a more ethically responsible environment. In other words, the commodification
of law renders our efforts demoralizing,
Second, to emphasize and prioritize ethics is not cost-free. A regulated profession
will be expensive; increased consumer remedies will drive up professional liability
insurance costs to lawyers.1 1 0 The impact could be twofold. Lawyers might, in tum,
reallocate such costs to consumers, making access to law even more expensive than it
already is; or, small-time lawyers may be forced out of business, again making access
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that much more difficult. Such costs cannot be avoided by wishful thinking.1 1 1
However, an awareness of costs should not be raised as an insurmountable barrier to
the possibility of enhanced professional responsibility. Rather, costs are but a variable
that must be factored into the necessarily complex social equation.
Finally, I want to suggest that pessoptimism counsels neither crude economic
determinism 1 1 2 nor ahistorical sentimentalism. 1 1 3 It is not redemptive 1 14 in its
orientation, nor is it grounded in anti-professionalism.1 15 Rather, pessoptimism
advocates a realistic and contextualized analysis which argues that lawtalk and legal
practice are terrains of social, economic, political and moral contestation. Those of us
who are engaged in the practices of law always and already (if inchoately) know this.
It is through conferences such as this that we can bring these contestations to the fore
in a struggle for professional reformation and realignment. The result, I would hope,
is that even if we cannot agree how we can do more good, we might at least agree how
we can do less harm.
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